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Th e M a r g a r e t C h a s e S m i t h E s s ay

American Democracy and Governance in a
Polarized Era
by Richard Barringer
WE the PEOPLE of the United
States, in order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common
Defence, promote the General Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
Ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America….
—Preamble, US Constitution, 1787

AND WHERE DO WE
STAND TODAY?

W

here do we stand today amid
America’s sharply divided politics
and governance? I argue here that in less
than two and a half centuries since the
nation’s founding, it has gone from the
espousal of democracy and the general
welfare to the pursuit of autocracy and
corporatism. In the absence of fundamental reforms, America’s founding principles and our national character are at
risk.
Robert Dahl, the most widely
honored political scientist of the 20th
century, observes in his classic treatise,
On Democracy (2015), that Americans
understand democracy largely in
Madisonian terms, whereby various
constitutional checks are held to be our
essential safeguards against tyranny and
autocracy.
After exhaustive study of democracies, however, Dahl finds it preferable to
think in terms of three types of democracy, namely:
• the Populist, characterized by
apparent majority rule, while
ignoring the observable fact of
6

rule by a minority, wherein a
minority with strong preferences
may overrule a majority with weak
preferences;
• the Pluralist, distinguished by
peaceful coexistence among
different interests and tolerance
among separate values and goals
(still, Dahl asks, how do we resolve
conflicts along abiding fissures,
such as race and gender?); and
• the Polyarchal, which stresses
social rather than constitutional
safeguards, encourages moderation, and emphasizes a high rate
of political activism and training
in social norms to maximize
consensus about their value and
usefulness.
Dahl argues that we have fallen too
much under the spell of James Madison.
To Dahl, the safety of democracy lies not
in a complex network of constitutional
checks and balances like the separation of
powers, staggered terms, presidential veto,
and judicial review; rather, it lies in the
internalizing of restraints within the
conscience, attitudes, and behavior of a
nation’s citizens, who in the end constitute democracy’s ultimate safeguard.
John Adams, our second president,
strongly rejected the illusions of the
French Enlightenment that so enthralled
Thomas Jefferson, the third president;
namely,
• that the “People” are possessed of
preternatural wisdom that guides
their decisions;
• that human beings are basically
and profoundly rational creatures;
and

• that American society is somehow
immune to the ancient European
hierarchical class divisions.
Mount Holyoke College historian
Joseph Ellis (American Dialogue, 2018)
explains Adams’s belief that all societies
inevitably produce social and economic
elites that, left unchecked, achieve political domination at the expense of everyone
else. Only a strong executive branch is
able to provide the balance and stability
required for a large, continental republic.
Adams advocated that all aristocracies
must be controlled to protect democracy
and the marketplace regulated to avoid its
inherent and abiding excesses.
Ellis argues that from the 1930s
through the late 1970s, Adams’s insight
and wisdom prevailed in the United
States, and that a Grand Bargain was
forged from the New Deal of FDR to the
Great Society of LBJ. Free-market regulation was enacted to meet the egalitarian
expectations of democracy, and social
programs were designed to distribute the
nation’s increasing wealth and power
more equitably.
Since the late 1970s and 1980s,
however, this Grand Bargain has been
abandoned. The diamond-shaped income
distribution of the Grand Bargain has
morphed into the old, aristocratic
European triangle, with exceedingly few
at the top of the income and power distribution, and very many at the bottom. To
achieve this, the prevailing New Right
required a massive dose of amnesia, as
well as a radically revisionist view of
history.
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Ellis observes that today’s debate
about the federal role in society is a
central feature of the ongoing American
dialogue, as it has been from the very
beginning, in the bitter argument between
Jefferson’s Republicans and Alexander
Hamilton’s Federalists. Today, however,
“the rising tide lifts only yachts. The
growing disparity of wealth is undeniable,
as the values of capitalism trump those of
democracy” (Ellis 2018: 104–105).
In Time Magazine of September
14, 2020, authors Nick Hanauer and
David Rolf explain, based on a new and
groundbreaking analysis by the conservative Rand Corporation, that “the elephant
in the room today is extreme income
inequality; and just how big is this
elephant? A staggering $50 trillion, in all!”
(Hanauer and Rolf 2020). Had the more
equitable income distributions of the
three decades following World War II
merely held steady, the aggregate income
of Americans earning below the 90th
percentile would have been $2.5 trillion
higher in 2018 alone, enough to pay
every working American in the bottom
nine deciles an additional $1,144 a
month, every month, every year!
For three decades from the late 1940s
to late 1970s, those at the bottom and
middle of the distribution saw their
incomes grow at about the same rate as
those at the top. This was the era of the
Grand Bargain, in which America built
the world’s largest and most prosperous
middle class, an era in which income
inequality among income groups steadily
shrank.
Economics and policy are all about
choice. This upward redistribution of
income, wealth, and power was not a
foregone conclusion; it was a choice, the
direct result of policies we have chosen to
implement since 1975. We chose to cut
taxes on billionaires and to deregulate the
financial industry. We chose to erode the

minimum wage, the overtime threshold,
and the bargaining power of labor.
“For four decades,” Hanauer and
Rolf conclude, “we chose to elect political
leaders who chose to put the material
interests of the rich and powerful above
those of the American people. We could
choose to build a more equitable, resilient, and prosperous America by choosing
to include every American in it!”
In their American Amnesia, economists Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson
(2016: 7–9) argue that all nations that
achieved widespread affluence in the 20th
century did so upon the catapult of the
mixed economy. “It takes government—a
good deal of it—to make advanced societies flourish for all.” The mixed economy,
they assert, “may well be the greatest
invention in all of human history, a spectacularly positive-sum bargain. And now
we’re trashing it!”
In a mixed economy, markets play
the dominant role in producing and allocating goods and services, and innovating
to meet consumer demand. Government
plays a vital and dominant role at the
same time, when markets fall short or fail.
Hacker and Pierson cite several great challenges facing the nation today, in which
we once led and now trail other advanced
nations, including
• public health and health care
(United States ranks 17th)
• education (20th, where once we
were the undisputed leader)
• income equality (most unequal
among all advanced nations)
• research and development (9th)
• environment and climate change
(33rd)
• infrastructure investment (15th)
Hacker and Pierson offer no magic
bullet to restore the nation’s pre-eminence, but they do point to several critical
needs:
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• to reform the political system to
make it more majoritarian;
• to rebuild the capacity of government, to make it work better;
• to empower the people by guaranteeing the right to vote, reducing
the role of money in elections, and
rebuilding labor unions; and
• to amplify the voices of the more
moderate and progressive private
corporations.
In How Democracies Die (2018),
political scientists Steven Levitsky and
Daniel Ziblatt explain that, where it once
was common, blatant military dictatorship has disappeared from much of today’s
world. They find that democratic backsliding often begins at the ballot box.
Today, unlike the more distant past,
there is no single moment when democracy gives way to authoritarian and dictatorial leaders; its erosion may be almost
imperceptible. Abdication of their responsibility by current political leadership
generally marks a nation’s first step toward
authoritarianism. Political parties and
party leaders are democracy’s gatekeepers
and defenders!
When fear and miscalculation lead
established parties to bring extremists
into the mainstream, democracy is imperiled. Institutions alone are not enough to
reign in autocrats. Without robust norms
of behavior, constitutional checks are not
enough to safeguard democracy.
Like Dahl, Levitsky and Ziblatt
argue that democracies work best when
constitutional mechanisms are reinforced
by unwritten but accepted norms of
behavior. In the United States, two such
basic norms are mutual toleration and
restraint in using institutional prerogatives (like the Senate filibuster, now used
to excess). These norms are democracies
guardrails, and they are weakening, especially from partisan polarization, and
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morphing into a fixed battle over social
issues of race, gender, and culture.
Levitsky and Ziblatt find four behavioral signs of incipient authoritarianism:
when a politician rejects the democratic
rules of the game; denies the legitimacy of
opponents; incites or encourages violence;
and curtails the legitimate civil liberties of
opponents.
SO, WHERE DO WE
GO FROM HERE?

I

n 2019, the American Academy of Arts
& Science created a Commission on
the Practice of Democratic Citizenship.
The commission (including such notables
as Judy Woodruff of PBS, David Brooks
of the New York Times, and Norman
Ornstein of the American Enterprise
Institute) conducted 47 public listening
sessions across America.
At one such session in Bangor,
Maine, the commission heard from a
local woman who responded to the question, “What is our responsibility, living in
a democracy?” “I think that’s a great question,” she replied, “and I don’t know that
I’ve ever been asked it before. I just
wonder to what extent we all understand
what a democracy is really all about.”
In June 2020, the commission
released its unanimous report, Our
Common Purpose, with some 30 recommendations “to better the Common
Good.” It identifies several imperatives at
the heart of our nation’s civic dilemma: to
achieve equality of voice and representation, ensure the responsiveness of our
political institutions, build a civic infrastructure for shared purpose, and inspire
commitment to democracy (AAAS 2020).
The commission sets forth several
recommendations to address each imperative, including
• ranked choice voting in all federal
and state elections,
8

• a constitutional amendment to
regulate spending in elections,
• all federal elections to be held on
the Veterans Day holiday,
• universal automatic voter registration,
• required voting in federal elections,
• new technologies for wider participation in official meetings,
• universal expectation of at least
one year of public service, and
• civics education available for all
ages, in all communities.
We live in a time of political crisis
when nothing less than American democracy, itself, hangs in the balance. In 1863
amidst civil war, Abraham Lincoln spoke
of preserving “government of the people,
by the people, for the people.” In 1981,
Ronald Reagan declared, “In the present
crisis, government is not the solution to
our problem; government is the problem.”
There is a straight line from Barry
Goldwater to Milton Friedman to Ronald
Reagan to Lee Atwater to Karl Rove to
Newt Gingrich to Mitch McConnell to
Donald Trump to January 6, 2021; a
straight line from concern for the General
Welfare and the common good to individual acquisitiveness and corporate
aggrandizement; a straight line in terms
of their positions on labor, the environment, public health, rule by majority,
control of the courts, racial justice,
women’s rights, and voting rights.
No dearth exists today of thoughtful
reforms if only we will act with good
effect. Most needed is that after decades
of war and climate denial, persistent
racism and sexism, oppressive income
inequality, and chronic neglect of the
nation’s public health, R&D, and infrastructure, the national government must
do all it might to demonstrate anew its
ability make a difference in the lives of

America’s working and middle class
families.
“Civilizations die from suicide, not
by murder,” observes the great British
historian Arnold J. Toynbee. May we
heed his warning!
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